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LA PROMESA CUMPLIDA [THE PROMISE
FULFILLED]: HOW THE U.S. CONSTITUTION HAS
ENABLED COLONIALISM
Dean Delasalas
On June 30, 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) into law to address
Puerto Rico’s debt crisis. 1 The crisis began in 2006 when Puerto Rico entered a
recession caused by a decade-long decline in manufacturing. 2 The Puerto Rican
government subsequently laid off government employees, privatized public
assets, and issued refinancing bonds to pay creditors. 3 Those measures were
ineffectual. Puerto Rico has approximately 120 billion dollars in bond and
pension debt, 4 defaults on that debt, 5 junk status bonds 6 and, now with
PROMESA, a government stripped of much of its autonomy.
PROMESA was Congress’s response to Puerto Rico’s inability to resolve the
debt crisis. On June 28, 2014, Puerto Rico passed the Recovery Act to prevent
creditors from invoking contractual remedies to obtain payment from public
entities. 7 However, creditors holding two billion dollars in Puerto Rican bonds
sued Puerto Rico in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
arguing that the Recovery Act encroached on Congress’s power to set uniform

J.D., T he Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 2018; B.A., University of
Maryland, College Park, 2015.
1. Heather Long, President Obama Signs Puerto Rico Rescue Bill, CNN (June 30, 2016,
5:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/29/investing/puerto-rico-debt-promesa/.
2. See generally Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: How Did We Get Here, BBC (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world- us-canada-35368786 (explaining that the 2006 recession in
Puerto Rico was caused by the 1996 repeal of a federal tax provision that had incentivized
manufacturers to do business in Puerto Rico).
3. Pirates of the Caribbean: How Santander’s Revolving Door with Puerto Rico’s
Development Bank Exacerbated a Fiscal Catastrophe for the Puerto Rican People , HEDGE
CLIP P ERS (Dec. 13, 2016), http://hedgeclippers.org/pirates-of-the-caribbean-how-santandersrevolving-door-with-puerto-ricos-development-bank-exacerbated-a-fiscal-catastrophe-for-thepuerto-rican-people/#_ftnref2.
4. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Grills Officials on Found Money, Years of Accounting
Woes, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-puertorico-debt-accounti
ng/puerto-rico-board-grills-officials-on-found-money-years-of-accounting-woesidUSKBN1F8294?il=0 (describing a two-hour hearing in which the Oversight Board excoriated
Puerto Rican officials for failing to account for approximately seven billion dollars).
5. See Pirates of the Caribbean, supra note 3.
6. Claudia Assis, Moody’s Downgrades Puerto Rico’s Bonds Further into Junk,
MARKETW ATCH (Oct. 11, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/moodys-downgr
ades-puerto-ricos-bonds-further-into-junk-2017-10-11.
7. Franklin Cal. T ax-Free T r. v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583–84 (D.P.R. 2015).
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bankruptcy laws. 8 On February 6, 2015, the court found for the creditors and
enjoined Puerto Rico from enforcing the Recovery Act. 9 On June 13, 2016, the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, thereby precluding Puerto
Rico from accessing relief under federal bankruptcy laws and from passing
measures to obtain similar relief. 10 Two weeks later, President Obama signed
PROMESA into law. 11
Congress enacted PROMESA in accordance with its power under the
Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution “to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations for territories.”12 PROMESA’s stated purpose is to help
Puerto Rico “achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets” 13
by permitting Puerto Rico to restructure its debt in an orderly fashion. 14 For
those purposes, the PROMESA created a Financial Oversight and Management
Board (Oversight Board) 15 and prohibited Puerto Rico from “exercis[ing] any
control, supervision, oversight, or review over the Oversight Board or its
activities . . . .”16 The Oversight Board can cut “nondebt expenditures,”17
prevent the enforcement of regulations it finds inconsistent with the fiscal plans
it has approved, 18 and crack down on protesting public sector employees. 19
PROMESA has provoked mixed and often vehement reactions. 20 ThenGovernor Alejandro García Padilla of Puerto Rico described PROMESA as
8. Id. at 584–85.
9. Id. at 614.
10. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. T ax-Free T r., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016). During the
litigation, Senator Richard Blumenthal and Representative Pedro Pier luisi of Puerto Rico
introduced bills in Congress permitting Puerto Rican cities to access bankruptcy protection. See
Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015, H.R. 870, 114th Cong. (2015) (noting
Representative Pierluisi’s Bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial and Antitrust Law without further action taken); Puerto Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity
Act of 2015, S. 1774, 114th Cong. (2015) (noting Senator Blumenthal’s bill was read twice and
referred to the Committee of the Judiciary without further action taken).
11. See Long, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
12. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§
2101–2241, 2121(b)(2) (2012).
13. Id. § 2121(a).
14. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The Fight to Relieve Puerto Rico’s Debt Is in Congress’s
Hands, STAN . L. SCH . (June 14, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/14/the-fight-to-relievepuerto-ricos-debt-crisis-in-congresss-hands/.
15. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1).
16. Id. § 2128(a)(1).
17. Id. § 2143(d)(1).
18. Id. § 2144(b)(5).
19. Id. § 2124(h).
20. See, e.g., Ongoing Puerto Rico Protest Camp Blasts “Colonial” PROMESA Bill,
T ELE SUR (July 12, 2016), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Ongoing-Puerto-Rico-ProtestCamp-Blasts-Colonial-PROMESA-Bill-20160712-0016.html (reporting on protesters against
PROMESA who had set up tents around the U.S. Federal Court building in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
and called PROMESA an example of “ colonial dictatorship”). See also Raul L. Reyes, Experts:
PROMESA Act Done, Job Now Is to Keep Puerto Rico Afloat Amid Debt, NBC NEWS (Aug. 10,
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Puerto Rico’s opportunity “to take [the] island from creditors and return it to
the people.”21 In contrast, Padilla’s successor Ricardo Rosselló in August 2017,
defied the Oversight Board’s demand to furlough government employees as a
cost-saving measure and connected PROMESA back to Puerto Rico’s “unfair
colonial condition.”22 Outside of Puerto Rico, PROMESA has alarmed officials
in other U.S. territories who have had to assure their citizens that their own
problems were not severe enough to warrant an oversight board. 23
On September 20, 2017, the situation worsened for Puerto Rico with the
arrival of Hurricane Maria, the strongest hurricane to hit Puerto Rico in over
eighty years. 24 Hurricane Maria covered more than half of the island, ripping
electrical-transmission towers out of the ground, generating torrents
necessitating the immediate evacuation of over 70,000 people, and killing
approximately 2,975 people. 25 The death toll likely would have been higher but
for Puerto Rico’s fortune of not having too many low -lying areas. 26 In addition
2016, 10:41 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/experts-promesa-act-done-job-nowkeep-puerto-rico-afloat-n627181 (noting that, even in the best case scenario, PROMESA could fix
the debt crisis, but not adequately address “ overall economic growth” in Puerto Rico). Judge Juan
T orruella of the First Circuit denounced PROMESA as “ the ‘most humiliating, contemptuous,
undemocratic and colonial act ever seen throughout [Puerto Rico’s] entire relationship with the
United States . . . .’” Cindy Burgos Alvarado, Judge Torruella Calls for ‘Economic Boycott’ and
‘Civil Resistance’ Against Fiscal Board, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Sept. 11, 2016),
http://caribbeanbusiness.com/judge-torruella-requests-economic-boycott-and-civil-resistanceagainst-fiscal-board/. Judge T orruella himself faced intense criticism for also suggesting Puerto
Ricans form a “ civil resistance movement ” against PROMESA’s implementation. Eva Lloréns
Vélez, Judge Torruella Gains Controversy over ‘Civil Resistance’ Remarks, CARIBBEAN BUS.
(Sept. 11, 2016), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/judge-torruella-gains-controversy-over-civilresistance-encouragement/.
21. Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC
NEWS LATINO , (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-howpromesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 (translating the original quote); see Reacciones
a la Aprobación de PROMESA, EL NUEVO DÍA (June 29, 2016, 8:51 PM),
http://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/reaccionesalaaprobaciondepromesa-2216356/
(“ Hoy estamos recuperando al país; con la aprobación de PROMESA comenzamos a quitárselo a
los acreedores y a devolvérselo a los puertorriqueños.” (original quote)).
22. Puerto Rico Governor Delivers Defying Speech After Controversial Fiscal Board
Meeting, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Aug. 4, 2017), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-rico-governordelivers-speech-after-controversial-fiscal-board-meeting/.
23. Ernice Gilbert, VI Noosed to Bondholders as Senators Pass $247 Million Debt Financing
Bill, T HE V. I. CONSORTIUM (Nov. 4, 2016), http://viconsortium.com/government-2/vi-noosed-tobondholders-as-senators-pass-247-million-debt-financing-bill/.
24. Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening with the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico?, T HE ATL .
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what -happened-in-puertorico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956/.
25. See generally Matthias Schwartz, Maria’s Bodies, N.Y. MAG . (Dec. 22, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/hurricane-maria-man-made-disaster.html;
Leyla
Santiago et al., Puerto Rico Hurricane Maria’s Death Toll Is 46 Times Higher than the
Government’s Previous Count, CNN (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/0
8/28/health/puerto-rico-gw-report-excess-deaths/index.html.
26. See Schwartz, supra note 25.
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to the tragic loss in human life and dramatic increase in human suffering,
Hurricane Maria has been estimated to cost the Puerto Rican people between
forty-five billion and ninety-five billion dollars in damages. 27
Given the looming presence of the Oversight Board in Puerto Rico as Puerto
Rico attempts to recover from both its crippling debt and the devastation of
Hurricane Maria, it is worth examining PROMESA. Despite the reactions
PROMESA has provoked, PROMESA is not an aberration in constitutional law.
Rather, PROMESA highlights a major problem in the Constitution: the virtually
limitless power granted to Congress to regulate the Territories of the United
States. PROMESA is one of many examples of how Congress has wielded that
power to treat the U.S. Territories as colonies and thereby betray the United
States’ democratic values. 28 Therefore, PROMESA is as much a warning to the
other U.S. Territories about the constitutionality of such action as it is a wakeup call to those who reside in the United States proper. This concern is
independent of PROMESA’s merits. Perhaps PROMESA’s debt restricting
provisions are necessary for Puerto Rico’s long-term economic survival and
recovery. Nonetheless, the American people should avoid exclusively focusing
on expediency when determining what remedies to use.
This Note will first survey the case law regarding the Territory Clause,
focusing on two periods: the founding of the United States to the SpanishAmerican War in 1898 and the Spanish-American War to the present. Then, the
Note will explain the current status of the territorial governments. Afterward,
the Note will examine the terms of PROMESA in light of the previous sections
and connect them to precedent and current events. Finally, the Note will discuss
what PROMESA portends for the other U.S. Territories.
I.
A.

PRIOR LAW : T HE GROUNDWORK

FOR

PROMESA

The Territory Clause Enables United States Colonialism

The Territory Clause enables Congress “to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States . . . .”29 Though the Territory Clause’s text distinguishes
between “Territory” and “property,” those terms are used interchangeably. 30
Theoretically, this interchangeability permits Congress to treat U.S. Territories
27. Jill Disis, Hurricane Maria Could Be a $95 Billion Storm for Puerto Rico , CNN MONEY
(Sept. 28, 2017, 3:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/news/economy/puerto -ricohurricane-maria-damage-estimate/index.html.
28. T his Article uses the word “ colony” the same way José T rías Monge, former Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, used the word “ colony”: “ to denote that the United States
unnecessarily holds excessive powers over Puerto Rico, thoughtlessly preventing it from attaining
a respected place on earth . . . .” JOSÉ T RÍAS MONGE , I NJUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW : THE
I NSULAR CASES AND OTHER ODDITIES 233 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
30. Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN . L. REV. 1168, 1225–26 (2011).
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such as Puerto Rico as it would Howland Island, 31 an uninhabited island with a
climate the CIA describes as “scant rainfall, constant wind, [and] burning sun.”32
As Professor Gary Lawson has noted, the Territory Clause appears “structured
to facilitate the[] treatment [of the territories] as colonies” because it lumps the
territories in with other U.S. property. 33 The words of Gouverneur Morris, the
drafter of the Territory Clause, lend credence to that conclusion. 34 Morris
claimed to have written the Territory Clause to enable Congress to treat the
Territories as “provinces” with “no voice” in the federal government. 35 Though
Morris’s view may be an outlier, the Territory Clause does “place territorial selfgovernance at the mercy of the national political branches . . . .” 36
In his analysis of the Territory Clause, Justice Joseph Story reaches a similar
conclusion. In Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice
Story likens Congress’s power under the Territory Clause to the conqueror’s
right to rule over acquired territory. 37 He argues that, until Congress admits a
territory into the Union, treaty terms and congressional action determine whether
people in the Territories can have “the privileges, rights, and immunities” of
United States citizens. 38 Justice Story presciently wonders whether people in
the Territories would receive such liberties “without any express stipulation,”
but avoids answering his own question because he thought the question would
never arise. 39
In A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution, Justice Story argues that
Congress can impose “general regulation” over newly acquired territory. 40 He
illustrates this regulatory power with his explanation of the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787. 41 Described as a “masterly display of the fundamental principles of
civil and religious and political liberty,”42 the Northwest Ordinance enabled
31. Id. at 1229.
32. The World Factbook Australia-Oceania: Howland Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/libr
ary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hq.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017).
33. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism , 78 CAL . L. REV.
853, 908–09 (1990) (quoting a letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston on December
4, 1803).
34. Id. at 908–09; see generally William Michael T reanor, Against Textualism , 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 983, 1000–01 (2009).
35. Lawson, supra note 33, at 908.
36. Id. at 909.
37. JOSEP H STORY , COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (3d.
ed 1858) [hereinafter STORY I].
38. Id. at 227–28.
39. Id. at 228.
40. JOSEP H STORY , A FAMILIAR EXP OSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONTAINING A BRIEF COMMENTARY ON EVERY CLAUSE , EXP LAINING THE T RUE
NATURE , REASONS, AND OBJECTS T HEREOF; DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF SCHOOL LIBRARIES AND
GENERAL READERS 138–39 (T he Lawbook Exchange, 1999) [hereinafter STORY II].
41. Id. at 139. Regrettably, Justice Story spends more time on the Northwest Ordinance than
he does on the actual text of the T erritory Clause. See id. at 139–41.
42. Id. at 139.
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Congress to micromanage the northwestern Territories. 43 Under it, Congress
granted the people of the territory religious freedom, a right to trial by jury,
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and procedural due process. 44
However, Congress appointed “all [the territorial governor’s] general officers,”
commissioned all five members of the legislative council, and reserved the right
to invalidate territorial laws it “disapproved of.”45
B.

The Supreme Court Has Consistently Held that Congress Has Plenary
Regulatory Power over the Territories of the United States

1. Pre-Spanish-American War Territory Clause Jurisprudence:
Absolutism Toward the Territories.
Following the path of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Territory Clause
jurisprudence gave the federal government increasing latitude to ignore, when
regulating the Territories, the ordinary constitutional limits on congressional
power. 46
In 1810, in Sere v. Pitot, the Supreme Court stated the Territory Clause gave
Congress “absolute and undisputed power of governing and legislating . . .” for
the Territories. 47 Debtors to French creditors claimed the District Court of the
territory of Orleans could not have jurisdiction over them because they were
citizens of a territory and therefore not citizens of a state. 48 They further argued
finding jurisdiction in the Orleans District Court would violate the Constitution’s
restriction on Congress’s ability to extend jurisdiction to cases brought against
the citizens of Territories. 49 Unanimously, the Supreme Court rejected the
debtors’ arguments because the Orleans District Court “must be considered as
having such jurisdiction as [C]ongress intended to give it[,]” the Constitution’s
limitations on jurisdiction notwithstanding. 50
In 1828, the Supreme Court deepened the dissonance between the normal
constitutional limitations on Congress and the Territory Clause’s plenary power
grant with its decision in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton. 51 The
43. T his level of micromanagement is consistent with Justice Story ’s belief that territories
were not meant to “participate in political power” or “ share in the powers of the general government
until they became a state . . . .” STORY I, supra note 37, at 228.
44. See Northwest Ordinance; July 13, 1787, YALE L. SCH . art. I–III,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
45. Id. § 5–6. As will be explained later in this Note, many have disputed Congress’s ability
to appoint territorial officials in this manner. See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
46. Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336–37 (1810).
47. Id. at 337.
48. Id. at 334.
49. Id. at 337.
50. Id. at 337–38.
51. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828); see STORY I, supra note 37, at 228 (stating that territorial
courts were “ in no just sense constitutional courts” and therefore “ incapable of receiving [the
Constitution’s judicial power].”). But see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN , T HE CONSTITUTION
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plaintiff insurance companies argued the Key West District Court in the thenterritory of Florida did not have jurisdiction over the parties because the
Constitution prohibited Congress from “vest[ing] admiralty-jurisdiction in
Courts created by territorial legislature.”52 However, the Supreme Court held
the Key West District Court had jurisdiction because territorial courts, as
“legislative Courts, created in virtue of [the Territory Clause],” did not have to
follow the Constitution’s limits on jurisdiction. 53 More importantly, the
Supreme Court stated that “[i]n legislating for [the Territories], Congress
exercises the combined power of the general, and of a state government.” 54
From 356 Bales of Cotton onward—with the exception of some
aberrations 55 —the Supreme Court expanded the Territory Clause’s
applications. 56 In 1879, in National Bank v. County of Yankton, the Supreme
Court held a territory’s county could donate bonds to a railroad company, not
because the act authorizing the donation was passed by the territorial legislature,
signed by the governor, and voted on by the county’s citizens, but rather because
Congress approved the act. 57 In dicta, Justice Morrison Waite wrote Congress
had “full and complete legislative authority over the people of the Territories . .
.” and could nullify the county’s acts. 58 However, he added that, regarding the

EMP IRE 146, 149 (2004) (arguing Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling on the status of territorial
courts “ respond[ed] to an argument advanced by neither party[]” and that his ruling was “ rather
flagrantly contrary to the clear meaning of the Constitution.”).
52. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 –66 (1878) (stating that the First
Amendment prohibits Congress from forbidding the free exercise of religion in the territories, but
upholding a federal anti-bigamy statute as constitutional because Congress can regulate religious
conduct such as religiously-mandated polygamy, not beliefs). See also EDIBERTO ROMÁN , THE
OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION
OF THE UNITED STATES’ NINETEENTH AND T WENTIETH CENTURY I SLAND CONQUESTS 40–45
(2006) (arguing three cases in the 1850s, Cross v. Harrison, Fleming v. Page, and the infamous
Dred Scott v. Sandford opinion, are sufficient evidence the Supreme Court determined the
Constitution applied automatically and fully to the territories); see also Juan R. T orruella,
Outstanding Constitutional and International Law Issues Raised by the United States-Puerto Rico
Relationship, 100 MINN . L. REV. HEADNOTES 79, 84–85 (2016) (asserting that, as a result of the
“ racially charged imperialistic mania” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court
ignored Dred Scott’s clear limitation of the T erritory Clause to “ lands held at the time of the treaty
with Great Britain in 1783 . . . .”).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840) (“[The] power [of the Territory
Clause] is vested in Congress without limitation . . . .”); see also Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
235, 242 (1850) (stating territorial courts were under the “ supervision and control” of Congress and
“ no[t] subject to [the Constitution’s] complex distribution of the powers of government . . . .”).
57. 101 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1879).
58. Id. at 133; see also Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 317, 320 (1873) (“The
extent of the power thus granted [to a territorial legislature] . . . is at all times subject to such
alterations as Congress may see fit to adopt.”).
OF
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regulation of the Territories, Congress did not have powers “expressly or by
implication reserved in the prohibition of the Constitution.” 59
The dicta of County of Yankton became the law in Late Corp. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States. 60 In 1890, the Mormon
Church sued the United States after Congress, under the Morrill Anti-Bigamy
Act of 1862, invalidated the charter of incorporation that the then-territory of
Utah had given to the Mormon Church. 61 The Supreme Court found for the
United States because it was “too plain for argument” that Congress could repeal
the charter whenever it saw fit to do so. 62 Nonetheless, the majority mused,
“Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the
Constitution and its amendments . . . .”63 Even so, the majority stated that such
limitations existed “by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution . . .
.”64
2.

Post-Spanish-American War Jurisprudence
a. The Impact of the Insular Cases: The Constitution Does Not Always
Follow the Flag

The aftermath of the Spanish-American War brought up the question Justice
Story had evaded decades prior: Did the Constitution automatically extend to
the Territories upon annexation, or did Congress have to expressly extend the
Constitution to the Territories?65
In the Treaty of Paris of 1898, Spain ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines,
and Guam to the United States. 66 The Treaty left the “civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the [T]erritories . . .” for Congress to
determine. 67 Scholars assumed Congress would eventually admit the Territories
as states with all the rights the Constitution guaranteed them. 68 However, the
59. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. at 133.
60. 136 U.S. 1, 42–45 (1890) [hereinafter Mormon Church].
61. Id. at 5–6.
62. Id. at 45. Such a ruling was unsurprising given that, roughly a month before, the Supreme
Court defined territories as organized entities whose powers “ are conferred upon them by act of
Congress, and [whose] legislative acts are subject to the disapproval of the Congress of the United
States.” In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443, 447 (1890).
63. Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 44.
64. Id.
65. See STORY I, supra note 37, at 227–28.
66. BARTHOLOMEW H. SP ARROW , T HE I NSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN EMP IRE 4 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 2006).
67. T reaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, art. IX,
¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
68. SP ARROW , supra note 66, at 4–6; see Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 4
(1955) (“ T erritorial government in the continental United States was customarily viewed as a
transition step to statehood . . . .”). But see Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New
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Insular Cases raised the possibility that Congress could keep the Territories as
possessions indefinitely with no guarantee that the Constitution’s protections
would apply to them. 69
The Insular Cases were a series of early 20th century cases that set the course
for modern Territory Clause jurisprudence. 70 A major impetus for these cases
was the annexation of Puerto Rico. 71 In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act
to replace the military occupation of Puerto Rico with a new “civil
government.”72 The Act gave Puerto Ricans an elected legislature whose laws
Congress could freely invalidate and provided Puerto Rican citizenship. 73
Whether the Constitution extended to Puerto Rico was a question in the first two
Insular Cases.
These cases, De Lima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell, occurred in 1901. 74
Both involved companies suing the collector of the port of New York over a
tariff on Puerto Rican goods. 75 In De Lima, the company argued payment of the
tariff imposed by the 1897 Dingley Act was improper because Puerto Rico was
not a foreign country for tariff purposes. 76 The Supreme Court agreed,
considering Puerto Rico and the other overseas Territories “domestic”
Territories for tariff purposes but excluding them from the United States. 77
Though strange, the situation was not out of the ordinary, given the long
Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 174–76 (1899) (arguing the United States could
hold territories as possessions unincorporated into United States and to which the Constitution
would not apply).
69. SP ARROW , supra note 66, at 6. See 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON & HENRY STEELE
COMMAGER, T HE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REP UBLIC 341 (1950) (“ T he petty islands and
guano rocks that had already been annexed had never raised, as Puerto Rico and the Philippines
did, the embarrassing question of . . . the nature and extent of Congressional control. ”).
70. SP ARROW , supra note 66, at 4–5. Scholars disagree about the number of cases to include
in the Insular Cases, with the cases being as few as five or as many as thirty -five. Compare id. at
257 (identifying thirty-five such cases) with David M. Helfield et al., Applicability of the United
States Constitution and Federal Laws to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico , 110 F.R.D. 449, 454
(1985) (identifying five cases). T hough not claiming to have a definitive number, this Note
disagrees with several of Professor Sparrow’s choices because they are duplicative. See, e.g.,
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (consisting only of a citation to Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901), another of the Insular Cases).
71. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 1 (1901).
72. Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77, 77–78 (1900).
73. Id. §§ 7, 31–32. Puerto Rico also had a governor appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 17. T he Act’s namesake Senator Joseph Foraker wanted to give
Puerto Ricans the opportunity to obtain U.S. citizenship, establish an elected legislature, and extend
the Constitution to Puerto Rico. SP ARROW , supra note 66, at 34–35. However, Foraker’s fellow
senators disagreed because they considered the Puerto Ricans “ ‘illiterate, and unacquainted with
[American] institutions, and incapable of exercising the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution to the States of the Union.’” Id.
74. Downes, 182 U.S. at 244; De Lima, 182 U.S. at 1.
75. Downes, 182 U.S. at 247; De Lima, 182 U.S. at 1.
76. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 180.
77. Id. at 199–200, 217.
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stretches of time between the acquisition of Territories and their admission into
the Union. 78 However, Downes destroyed the underlying assumption of
eventual statehood.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court used Downes to clarify the legal
precedents regarding the nature of Territories. 79 To do so, the Supreme Court
had to determine the meaning of “United States.”80 The Supreme Court
struggled to reconcile the possible constitutional limitations on the Territory
Clause with cases like 356 Bales of Cotton, which held that Congress had
“complete and supreme” power over the Territories. 81 Interestingly, the
Supreme Court discussed Chief Justice Roger Taney’s analysis of the Territory
Clause in the Dred Scott decision in which he concluded the Territory Clause
did not permit Congress to establish territorial governments. 82 However, the
Supreme Court found Dred Scott distinguishable from Downes because Dred
Scott involved the removal of slaves—”property”—from U.S. citizens settling
in a territory. 83 Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined the Constitution
applied only to “the States whose people united to form the Constitution, and
such as have since been admitted to the Union upon an equality with them.”84
Consequently, the Supreme Court articulated the extension doctrine. 85 Under
this doctrine, “the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase
or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.”86 The Supreme
Court first examined instances in which either Congress or treaty terms
expressly conferred rights to the Territories. 87 Then, interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court distinguished the states of the Union from “any
place subject to their jurisdiction . . .” (i.e. Territories). 88 Finally, looking at the
various treaties, the Supreme Court posited there was a period of time between
annexation and “the proper time [for admission] . . . to the enjoyment of all

78. See SP ARROW , supra note 66, at 3 (noting considerable variations in “ the length of time
between when an area came under U.S. sovereignty and when Congress admitted it as a state . . ., ”
with Oklahoma taking 104 years to be admitted).
79. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 258 (acknowledging its decisions regarding this issue “ ha[d] not
been altogether harmonious”).
80. See id. at 249.
81. See id. at 258, 263–67.
82. Id. at 250.
83. Id. at 274–75.
84. Id. at 277.
85. STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN , T HE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES T ERRITORIES AND
AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS 116 (1995).
86. Downes, 182 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., id. at 254 (reasoning the citizens of the Louisiana T erritory were granted
“ liberty, property, and religion,” not by the Constitution, but rather by the Louisiana Purchase’s
terms). See also id. at 269 (agreeing with an earlier decision nullifying the prohibition for jury
trials in restitution cases in the then-territory of Iowa because Congress, “ by express provision and
by reference, extended the laws of the United States . . .” to Iowa.).
88. Id. at 277.
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rights of citizens of the United States . . . .”89 The Supreme Court asserted that,
during that period, public opinion, the moral character of Congress, and the
“principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character” would
safeguard the Territories. 90 It thus regarded disagreement with Congress’s
decision regarding the acquisition and regulation of a territory as “solely a
political question.”91
In his concurrence, Justice White articulated the incorporation doctrine. 92
Under this doctrine, Congress could regulate a territory without making it part
of the United States. 93 Determining the Constitution’s allocation of powers to
Congress would properly limit Congress’s power under the Territory Clause,94
Justice White focused on Congress’s discretion under both the Territory Clause
and its role in ratifying treaties. 95 He believed immediately incorporating the
Territories into United States upon annexation would deprive the American
people, through Congress, of their right to determine who should be part of the
United States. 96 Justice White concluded the United States could hold Puerto
Rico, and by extension the other Territories, as “possession[s]” to which the
Constitution would not apply. 97
With the Constitution not automatically applicable to the Territories, the
Supreme Court had to determine what constitutional protections did apply. In
1903, the Supreme Court upheld a Hawaiian man’s manslaughter conviction
even though he was not formally indicted by a grand jury or convicted by a
unanimous jury because the inclusion of such procedural mechanisms were “not

89. Id. at 280 (quoting T reaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement Between the United
States of America and the Mexican Republic, art. IX, July 8, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter T reaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo]). Like the other examples the Court cited, the T reaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
expressly protected the liberty, property, and free exercise of religion of the citizens of the ceded
territory. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. IX. Chief Justice Fuller had a less rosy picture of this
intermediate period, claiming Downes permitted Congress to “ keep [Puerto Rico] . . . in an
intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period . . . .” Downes, 182 U.S. at 372
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
90. Downes, 182 U.S. at 280–82, 381. T he Court believed that the “ principles of the
Constitution” (but not the Constitution itself) would protect the citizens of the territories. Id. at 283
(emphasis added). Justice White had a similarly wishy-washy answer. Id. at 291 (White, J.,
concurring) (“ [E]ven in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies,
there may nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed,
although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution.”). Justice Gray was blunter. Id. at
346 (Gray, J, concurring) (“ If Congress is not ready to construct a complete government for the
conquered territory, it may establish a temporary government, which is not subject to all the
restrictions of the Constitution.”).
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id. at 299 (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. (White, J., concurring)
94. Id. at 298 (White, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 310–15 (White, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 315 (White, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 342 (White, J., concurring).
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fundamental” and their exclusion was “suited to the conditions of the islands,
and well calculated to conserve the rights of [those Territories’] citizens . . . .” 98
A year later, in Binns v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld a licensing fee
Congress directly imposed on Alaska in a case that only arose because Congress
did not give Alaska its own legislature. 99 The Supreme Court concluded
Congress did not have to establish a legislature for Alaska because Congress was
not “limited” to following the Constitution’s model of government when
establishing territorial governments. 100
By 1922, with Balzac v. Porto Rico, the incorporation doctrine became “the
settled law of the court.”101 Thus, to determine whether a Puerto Rican man
accused of libel was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, the
Supreme Court looked into whether Congress had incorporated Puerto Rico into
the Union and thereby extended the Constitution to Puerto Rico. 102 The
Supreme Court concluded Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico
when it passed the Jones Act in 1917 because it had granted Puerto Rico a
separate Bill of Rights. 103 Therefore, the Supreme Court held the man was not
entitled to a jury trial. 104
b. After the Insular Cases: Colonial Calculus in the Granting of
Constitutional Rights to the Territories
Since 1922, the Supreme Court has operated on the premise of Balzac: that,
while regulating the Territories, Congress can grant or withhold rights normally
guaranteed by the Constitution. 105 Consequently, for the Territories, the
determination of rights has turned into divinations into congressional intent and
constitutional hairsplitting.
98. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 208, 217–18 (1903). See also Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 148–49 (1904) (holding a man convicted of libel in the Philippines was not entitled
to a trial by jury because Congress did not expressly extend that right to the Filipino legal system).
But see T hompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1898) (holding Utah should have given a jury
trial to a man tried for stealing a calf right before Utah’s admission into the Union and later retried
after Utah’s admission into the Union because he was constitutionally entitled to one after Utah
became a state).
99. 194 U.S. 486, 492–93, 496 (1904).
100. Id. at 491–92. Cf. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1952) (holding the thenterritory of Alaska could not impose a licensing fee that discriminated against non-residents
because Congress could choose and did choose to make Alaska subject to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution).
101. 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922).
102. Id. at 304–06.
103. Id. at 306–07.
104. Id. at 313–314. T hough the Supreme Court acknowledged that jury trials enabled the
citizenry to “ prevent [the] arbitrary use or abuse” of the justice system, the Supreme Court
considered it improper to impose such a system upon people who were “ not brought up in a
fundamentally popular government . . . living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely
formed customs and political conceptions . . . . “ Id. at 310.
105. See Calero-T oledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5 (1974).
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In 1974, the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.
determined the Constitution’s formulation of due process applied to Puerto Rico
because Congress’s joint resolution approving Puerto Rico’s constitution
included due process among the provisions of the Constitution applied to Puerto
Rico. 106 Five years later, in Torres v. Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court concluded
the Fourth Amendment applied to Puerto Rico because Puerto Rico’s
constitution included a provision using the language of the Fourth
Amendment. 107 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court stated Congress could overrule
applications of the Constitution that interfered with Congress’s ability to
regulate the Territories. 108
With Harris v. Rosario in 1980, the Supreme Court placed only the flimsiest
restraints on Congress’s regulatory power over the Territories. 109 Accounting
for the Territory Clause, the Supreme Court applied rational basis scrutiny to
Congress’s decision to give less financial assistance to parents in Puerto Rico
than to parents in the States and upheld that decision. 110
Expanding on Harris, courts have found Congress only needs a rational basis
for treating Territories differently from the States. In 1987, the D.C. Circuit in
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints v. Hodel held Congress only needs a rational basis for having the
Secretary of the Interior control and supervise American Samoa’s courts. 111
Two years later, in Virgin Islands v. Dowling, the Third Circuit stated Congress
would only need a rational basis for permitting the U.S. Virgin Islands to give
“substantially more severe” sentences for grand larceny than is recommended
by federal guidelines. 112
In Territories, Congress did not incorporate rights such as citizenship that the
people in the States take for granted and must be bestowed by Congress or risk
exclusion. 113 In 2013, in Tuaua v. United States, the District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed the case of five American Samoans who argued
Congress’s decision to deny American Samoans U.S. citizenship violated the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 The court found the
Citizenship Clause did not apply to Territories and that citizenship was not a
fundamental right that could be extended to unincorporated Territories such as
American Samoa absent congressional action. 115
106. Id.
107. 442 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1979).
108. Id. at 470.
109. 446 U.S. 651, 651 (1980).
110. Id. at 651–52.
111. 830 F.2d 374, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
112. 866 F.2d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1989).
113. See, e.g., T uaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2013).
114. Id. at 94.
115. Id. at 94–98; see also Entines v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.D.C. 2016)
(holding a Filipino man born when the Philippines was still a U.S. territory did not have birthright
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Affirming the D.C. District Court’s verdict, the D.C. Circuit tied the
applicability of constitutional rights to the Territories to the practical concerns
that arise while regulating them. 116
The D.C. Circuit differentiated
“fundamental” and “non-fundamental” constitutional rights, with the latter
involving rights “idiosyncratic to the American social compact or to the AngloAmerican tradition of jurisprudence.”117 In respect to “non-fundamental”
constitutional rights, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[t]he means by which free and
fair societies may elect to ascribe the classification of citizen must accommodate
variation where consistent with respect for other, inherent and inalienable, rights
of persons.”118
C.

Current Congressional Micromanagement in Territorial Affairs as Seen in
the Territories’ Governing Documents
Unlike the States, U.S. Territories have organic acts instead of actual
constitutions. 119 Organic acts are statutes that “establish[] an administrative
agency or local government.”120 Because organic acts are federal statutes, the
federal government can easily change the territorial governments’ very structure
by amending the organic acts. 121 This fact applies even to Guam’s “Bill of
Rights,”122 which roughly approximates the Bill of Rights of the U.S.
Constitution. 123
Congress has designated Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands as
“unincorporated territor[ies] of the United States” and placed them under the

U.S. citizenship because such citizenship is not a right “ integral to free and fair society” when other
democratic nations base a person’s citizenship on his/her parent ’s nationality (quoting T uaua, 788
F.3d at 308)).
116. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 307 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008)).
117. Id. at 308.
118. Id. at 309. Because the elected leaders of American Samoa opposed birthright citizenship,
the D.C. Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs. Id. at 310.
119. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1428, 1541–1645 (2012) (referring to the organic act governing Guam
and to the organic act governing the U.S. Virgin Islands).
120. Organic Statute, BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that organic statutes
are the same as organic acts).
121. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 203–204 (1990) (“By a simple vote of Congress,
the Organic Act under which the unincorporated territory exists may be repealed and the limited
self government which it enjoys nullified”) (quoting Brief for Government of Virgin Islands, ex
rel. Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 8, Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990) (No. 88 -1281)); see Sakamoto v.
Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1421a); see also
Christopher Serkin & Nelson T ebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 733
(2016) (citing 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421a–b).
122. Serkin & T ebbe, supra note 121, at 733.
123. 48 U.S.C. § 1421b. Guam’s Bill of Rights is a mishmash of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill
of Rights and the limits of Congressional power as stated in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S.
Constitution. See id.
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control of the Secretary of the Interior. 124 Congress has expressly extended to
them, among other things, the first nine amendments of the U.S. Constitution,
the Thirteenth Amendment, and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 125
Notably, Congress has reserved the right to modify or repeal their laws. 126
Although Puerto Rico and American Samoa have constitutions, there is a
distinction without a difference between organic acts and territorial
constitutions, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted Congress may “unilaterally
repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution . . . and replace [it] with any rules or
regulations of [Congress’s] choice.”127 The federal government likewise
believes Puerto Rico’s unique status as a commonwealth did not remove Puerto
Rico from Congress’s regulatory power. 128 The Supreme Court agreed in Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, holding Puerto Rico was not a sovereign entity despite its
commonwealth status because its power originated from the federal government,
not from the citizens of Puerto Rico. 129
The Eleventh Circuit dicta at least holds true for American Samoa, because
Congress has reserved the right to amend its constitution. 130 No similar
provision exists in Puerto Rico’s constitution. 131 The American Samoan
constitution, as approved by Congress, vests all “civil, judicial, and military”
authority in the President of the United States until Congress establishes a formal
government for American Samoa. 132 The President in turn has tasked the
Secretary of the Interior with the administration of American Samoa. 133 Only
time will tell if the same holds true for Puerto Rico, but the abovementioned
dicta does not predict a favorable outcome.

124. Id. §§ 1421a, 1541(a)–(c).
125. Id. §§ 1421b(u), 1561.
126. Id. §§ 1421c(a), 1574(c).
127. United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152–53 (11th Cir. 1993). But see United States
v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034 (1988) (rejecting
the idea that Puerto Rico was not a sovereign entity because it found that the Puerto Rican
government’s power emanated from the Puerto Rico Constitution).
128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3 –4, Puerto Rico
v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (No. 15 -108).
129. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1876.
130. 48 U.S.C. § 1662a.
131. However, the lack of such a provision likely would not be a hindrance to Congress. See
Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879) ( “ In the organic act of Dakota there was
not an express reservation of power in Congress to amend the acts of th e territorial legislature, nor
was it necessary. Such a power is an incident of sovereignty, and continues until granted away. ”).
132. Revised Constitution of American Samoa, AM. SAM. BAR ASS’ N , http://www.asb
ar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177 (last visited Feb. 9,
2018).
133. Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417 (June 29, 1951).
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D. Recent Challenges to the Territory Clause’s Grant of Plenary Power
On August 7, 2017, objecting to a petition the Oversight Board had filed to
protect Puerto Rican assets, various creditors challenged the constitutionality of
PROMESA by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico. 134 Specifically, the creditors argued that the method used to appoint
the Oversight Board’s members violated the Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 135 The creditors contended that members of the Oversight Board
are officers of the United States and therefore their appointment must conform
to the procedure set out in the Appointments Clause, the Territory Clause
notwithstanding. 136
The creditors’ argument is not unheard of. 137 Professor Lawson proposed a
similar argument in 1990, only to cast doubt on his argument’s persuasiveness
in light of the Supreme Court’s willingness to have constitutional limits yield to
Congress’s plenary regulatory power over the Territories. 138
Such doubt was warranted. Ultimately, the Puerto Rico District Court held
the Appointments Clause did not place a limit on Congress’s powers under the
Territory Clause because longstanding jurisprudence has established that
Congress can create “governmental institutions for territories that . . . include
features that would not comport with the requirements of the Constitution if they
pertained to the governance of the United States.”139 Furthermore, the District
Court held that, even if the Appointment Clause did place such limits on those
powers, the Appointments Clause was inapplicable to the Oversight Board
because the members of the Oversight Board were not officers of the United
States. 140
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROMESA
PROMESA combines the worst of pre- and post-Spanish-American War
jurisprudence on the Territory Clause. PROMESA permits the pre-SpanishAmerican War excesses Congress indulged in with the United States’ earlier
Territories, while maintaining the post-Spanish-American war position that
permits Congress to experiment with the constitutional rights and protections of
the Territories to ensure the effective administration thereof.

134. Objection and Motion of Aurelius to Dismiss T itle III Petition, In re Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 301 F. Supp . 3d 288 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17 BK 3283–
LT S).
135. Id. at 1–5.
136. Id. at 11–17.
137. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 33, at 865.
138. Id. at 867–870, 874–77.
139. In re Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17 BK 3283 -LT S, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 117348, at *12–13, 24 (D.P.R. July 13, 2018).
140. Id. at *26.
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Provisions of PROMESA

PROMESA is divided into seven titles. 141 This Note is primarily concerned
with Titles I and II, both of which concern the Oversight Board. 142 Titles III and
VI govern the remedies Puerto Rico can seek while creditors file claims against
it. 143
Title I establishes a seven-person Oversight Board appointed by the President
of the United States. 144 The Oversight Board “provide[s] a method for a covered
territory to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.” 145
Interestingly, despite backlash regarding language in a previous draft that
included the other U.S. Territories in PROMESA, 146 PROMESA’s definition of
“territory” includes not only Puerto Rico, but also Guam, the American Samoa,
the Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 147
Several times in Title I the Oversight Board is permitted to make decisions
based on the Oversight Board’s “sole discretion.”148 These decisions range from
determining which public entities are within the Oversight Board’s purview to
demanding the territory’s governor develop a separate budget for certain public
entities. 149 In any case, PROMESA expressly prohibits territorial governments
from “exercis[ing] any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the
Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”150
Title II concerns the Oversight Board’s role in the development and
implementation of fiscal plans and budgets. 151 The Oversight Board serves as a
gatekeeper through the certification process. 152 Before the governor submits
fiscal plans and budgets to the legislature, the Oversight Board must certify

141. See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 (2016).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1), (e).
145. Id. § 2121(a) (emphasis added).
146. PROMESA H.R. 5278, 114th Cong. § 5(20) (2016); Stacey Plaskett, Promesa Bill Passes
with Revisions in Significant Victory for the U.S. Virgin Islands, Press Release (June 10, 2016),
https://plaskett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/promesa-bill-passes-revisions-significantvictory-us-virgin-islands (criticizing PROMESA for imposing “ Orwellian oversight boards” and
failing to provide Puerto Rico and the other territ ories with the means to “ grow their own
economies”).
147. 48 U.S.C. § 2104(20)(A)–(E).
148. See, e.g., id. § 2121(d)(1)(A)–(E).
149. See, e.g., id.
150. Id. § 2128(a)(1).
151. See generally id. §§ 2141–2152.
152. T his remains true even in the alternative budget certification process, PROMESA
provides: T he Oversight Board works with the governor and the legislature to jointly develop a
compliant budget and all parties involved “ certify that such budget reflects a consensus among
them.” 48 U.S.C. § 2142(f).
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whether those fiscal plans and budgets are compliant. 153 If those fiscal plans or
budgets are not compliant, the Oversight Board sets a deadline by which the
governor must make the necessary revisions. 154 If the governor fails to provide
the Oversight Board with a compliant fiscal plan or budget, the Oversight Board
can devise a compliant fiscal plan or budget itself. 155
Once the fiscal plan is established, Title II also requires the governor to submit
all newly enacted laws to the Oversight Board to ensure the laws are not
“significantly inconsistent” with the fiscal plan. 156 If the Oversight Board
determines otherwise, the territorial government must revise the law to eliminate
the inconsistency or give an explanation for the inconsistency the Oversight
Board finds “reasonable and appropriate.”157 If the territorial government fails
to do either, Oversight Board can “take such action as it considers necessary . .
. to ensure that the enactment or enforcement of the law will not adversely affect
the [territory’s] compliance with the Fiscal Plan, including preventing the
enforcement or application of the law.”158
B.

Revival of Congressional Micromanagement of the Territories

As the Supreme Court stated in Binns v. United States, the Territory Clause
grants Congress great flexibility to structure territorial governments however it
finds most convenient. 159 By creating the Oversight Board, a virtual fourth
branch of government in Puerto Rico, Congress is utilizing that flexibility as
proclaimed in PROMESA’s stated constitutional basis. 160 Through the
Oversight Board, Congress can expressly exercise the rights it would reserve for
itself in an organic act instead of reserving that right by implication. 161
With the procedure for submitting legislative acts to the Oversight Board,
Congress can exercise its age-old right to nullify territorial legislation, as it could
do under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and had done in County of
153. Id. §§ 2141(c)(3), 2142(c). Fiscal plans are compliant when they, among other things,
“ ensure the funding of essential public services,” “ provide adequate funding for public pension
systems,” “ improve fiscal governance, accountability, and internal controls,” and “ include a debt
sustainability analysis.” Id. § 2141(b)(1)(A)–(N). Budgets are compliant when they comply with
the fiscal plan the Oversight Board approved. Id. § 2142(c).
154. Id. §§ 2141(a), 2142(a).
155. Id. §§ 2141(d)(2), 2142(c)(2). For example, regarding the budgets for public entities, the
Oversight Board can reduce “ nondebt expenditures[,]” institute automatic hiring freezes, and
prohibit those entities from entering any contracts and “ entering into . . . any financial or other
transactions.” Id. § 2143(d)(2). Nonetheless, the Oversight Board must cancel those measures if
it determines that the public entities have initiated measures to make themselves compliant with
the budget. Id. § 2143(d)(1), (e).
156. Id. § 2144(a)(1)–(2).
157. Id. § 2144(a)(4)(B).
158. Id. § 2144(a)(5) (emphasis added).
159. 194 U.S. 486, 491–92 (1904).
160. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(2).
161. See id. § 2144(b)(5).
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Yankton. 162 Under the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico had to submit to Congress all
laws enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature, with Congress reserving the right
to nullify those laws “if deemed advisable.”163 Under Puerto Rico’s constitution,
a bill becomes law after receiving majority approval from the legislature and the
governor’s signature. 164 However, PROMESA brings back the last step of the
process in the Foraker Act with the Oversight Board acting in Congress’s stead.
In addition to outright nullifying laws, the Oversight Board can play the role
of the territorial legislature as Congress did for Alaska in Binns. 165 The only
difference is the Oversight Board can delegate to the territorial government the
grunt work of devising the fiscal plans, budgets, and laws. 166 The Oversight
Board is still in control because it not only assesses those items for compliance
with PROMESA, but also because it can force the Puerto Rican government to
revise those items to ensure compliance. 167 If the territorial government fails to
ensure compliance, PROMESA unceremoniously cuts out the territorial
government and enables the Oversight Board to create a compliant budget. 168
C.

Excessive Deference to Administrative Concerns that Promote a Lack of
Accountability and Redress
In several provisions of PROMESA, Congress effectively codifies the
congressional capriciousness defended in Mormon Church and lack of redress
announced in Downes. 169
Similar to how the Supreme Court in Downes made the acquisition of territory
a political question, Congress expressly prohibits the Puerto Rican government
from “exercis[ing] any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the
Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”170 Congress also enables the Oversight
Board to determine if the Puerto Rican government would be “enact[ing],
implement[ing], or enforce[ing] any statute, resolution, policy or rule that would
impair or defeat . . .” PROMESA. 171 Finally, Congress frees the Oversight

162. See id. § 2144(a)(1); Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1879); see
generally Northwest Ordinance; July 13, 1787, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nw
order.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
163. Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77, § 31 (1900).
164. P.R. Const. art. III, §§ 17, 19.
165. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
166. See generally 48 U.S.C. § 2144.
167. See id. §§ 2142(d)(2), 2144(a)(4)–(5).
168. Id. § 2142(d)(2).
169. See supra notes 62–65, 92 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, creditors have attempted
to collaterally attack the Oversight Board’s decision-making powers by questioning the legitimacy
of the Oversight Board itself. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text (arguing that the
Oversight Board lacked decision-making authority because its members were appointed in
violation of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
170. 48 U.S.C. § 2128(a)(1).
171. Id. § 2128(a)(2).
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Board and its members of any liability arising from actions taken in accordance
with PROMESA’s provisions. 172
Just as Congress in Mormon Church was free to revoke a territorial charter of
incorporation at any time, so is the Oversight Board often able to act in its “sole
discretion.”173 The Oversight Board can determine which agencies in Puerto
Rico need to present a budget to ensure compliance with the fiscal plan and how
long the Puerto Rican government has to correct the deficiencies it finds in
proposed fiscal plans. 174 The latter is especially significant because if the
Oversight Board determines the Puerto Rican government has not made those
corrections, the Oversight Board can simply substitute the proposed fiscal
plan(s) with a plan it has devised. 175
III. ANALYSIS: PROMESA IS A LOADED WEAPON
PROMESA illustrates the problem of having only “political substitutes for
strict self-governance”176 as the U.S. Territories’ safeguards against morally
dubious congressional action. 177 The “general spirit of the Constitution”178 is
merely a sentimental ideal when the Constitution’s text leaves open the
effectively unbridled indulgence of the colonial impulse.
A.

PROMESA is the Symptom of the Underlying Problem that is the Territory
Clause’s Text

PROMESA shows how weakly benevolence tempers Congress’s prerogative
under the Territory Clause. Some requirements of the proposed fiscal plans,
such as the adequate funding of pensions and public services, suggest
magnanimity from PROMESA’s drafters. 179 Nonetheless, the Oversight Board
172. Id. § 2125.
173. See, e.g., id. § 2121(d)(1)(A)–(D).
174. Id. §§ 2121(d)(1)(A)–(D), 2141(a).
175. Id. § 2141(d)(2).
176. Lawson, supra note 33, at 909. Unfortunately, Professor Lawson subscribes to the same
wishy-washiness to which this Note objects. See id. (advocating for keeping Congress’s broad
regulatory power but convincing Congress to achieve “ substantive goals” consistent with the
Framers’ intentions via “ free, albeit formalistically nonbinding, election[s]” of territorial governors
and “ rubber-stamp” the proposals of territorial “ ‘legislatures’”).
177. “ Morally dubious congressional action” is a necessarily awkward turn of phrase. “ Abuse
of congressional authority” flows better off the tongue, but such a phrase would contradict one of
this Note’s major arguments: Congress has such broad discretion under the T erritory Clause that
there can be no abuse of that discretion, notwithstanding any limitations implicitly set by the spirit
of the Constitution. T he only arguments against such broad discretion are those of moral outrage,
see, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States (Mormon
Church), 136 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1890) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting), or a challenge to the appointment of
the Oversight Board members. Perhaps pragmatism could limit Congress, should the circumstances
favor a gentle grip from Congress’s iron fist. However, neither moral outrage nor pragmatism are
serious legal arguments. In that sense, this Note begrudgingly agrees with Professor Lawson.
178. Id. at 44.
179. See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(B)–(C).
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provisions do not disturb Congress’s discretion concerning the regulation of the
Territories. 180 Moreover, with the Oversight Board able to interfere with the
enforcement of territorial laws and to scrap fiscal plans and budgets it disagrees
with, the ugliness of the colonial impulse in the Territory Clause’s text remains
unconcealed. Those provisions reveal the illusoriness of Puerto Rico’s freedom
under PROMESA to choose how to address its debt problems, and the futility of
appeals to the general spirit of the Constitution to limit the Territory Clause’s
power grant.
The colonial impulse has revealed itself in the Oversight Board’s interactions
with the Puerto Rican government. 181 On January 18, 2017, following its
obligations under PROMESA to consult with the Puerto Rican governor when
establishing a schedule for developing a fiscal plan, 182 the Oversight Board sent
a letter to Governor Rosselló. 183 Though the letter stated the Oversight Board
was “favorably inclined” to extend the deadline for the submission of the fiscal
plan, 184 it reminded Governor Rosselló of its “sole discretion to . . . change the
dates of such schedule as it deems appropriate and reasonably feasible.” 185
Exercising that discretion, the Oversight Board made the extension contingent
on having “no discussion or consideration of short-term liquidity loans or nearterm financings that could restrict fiscal options.”186
In the same letter, the Oversight Board recommended cutting pensions and
higher education and healthcare spending. 187 The letter appears innocuous
because of its soft language (“We encourage,” “[W]e recommend . . . .”). 188
However, the veneer of affability begins to peel off when the Oversight Board
mentions the fiscal plan must be a “viable fiscal plan that [it] may certify . . .” 189
according to its right under PROMESA. 190
Removing any doubt as to its power, the Oversight Board in February 7, 2017
said it was willing to use PROMESA’s enforcement mechanisms to ensure
180.
181.

See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text.
See Robert Slavin, Puerto Rico Governor Says No to Board’s Austerity Demands, BOND
BUYER (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/puerto -rico-governorsays-no-to-boards-austerity-demands-1123404-1.html.
182. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a).
183. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R. 1 (Jan. 18, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Carrión I].
184. Id. at 8.
185. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a).
186. Carrión I, supra note 183, at 8 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 5–6. T he Oversight Board reiterated this point during a presentation on January 28,
2017 in which the Oversight Board said that it wanted to cut healthcare spending by as much as
“ 28%.” Fiscal Plan Targets Presentation, FIN . OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD . FOR P.R. (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/588cd7c0e0274.pdf.
188. Carrión I, supra note 183, at 7, 9.
189. Id. at 1.
190. 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).
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Puerto Rico’s compliance with the desired Fiscal Plan. 191 The Oversight Board
affirmed its willingness to do so in August 30, 2017, when it threatened to stop
enforcement of a proposed law empowering the Puerto Rican government to
assist citizens whom health insurance companies had denied coverage because
the proposed law was significantly inconsistent with the Fiscal Plan approved in
March 2017. 192
In August 2017, the Oversight Board took the logical next step when it sued
Governor Rosselló to force compliance with the Fiscal Plan. 193 In March 2017,
the Puerto Rican government had submitted a Fiscal Plan including potential
furloughs for government employees and teachers, 194 in addition to reductions
in healthcare spending for the 2018 fiscal year by $100 million, and in higher
education spending by $450 million. 195 Nonetheless, in June 2017, after
reviewing the Puerto Rico’s proposed budget for compliance with the Fiscal
Plan, the Oversight Board demanded an additional spending cut of $319 million
to ensure compliance. 196 In August 2017, the Oversight Board ordered the
Puerto Rican government to furlough government employees to save an
additional $218 million. 197 When Governor Rosselló refused, the Oversight
Board sued him, only to retract the lawsuit and postpone discussion of furloughs
in the wake of Hurricane Maria. 198 Nonetheless, the Oversight Board insisted

191. Letter for José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to
Elias F. Sánchez, Governor’s Representative 1 (Feb. 7, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Carrión II].
192. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R., T homas Rivera Schatz, President of the
Senate of P.R, and Carlos J. Méndez Núnez, Speaker of the House of Reps. of P.R. (Aug. 30, 2017)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Carrión III].
193. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Asks Court to Enforce Furloughs, REUTERS
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-labor/puerto-rico-oversightboard-asks-court-to-enforce-furloughs-idUSKCN1B81WS.
194. Board Resolution Adopted on March 13, 2017 (Fiscal Plan Certification), FIN .
OVERSIGHT AND MGMT. BD . FOR P.R 2 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/.
195. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R. 3–4 (Mar. 9, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Carrión IV].
196. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to T homas Rivera Schatz, President of the Senate of P.R, and Carlos J. Méndez Nún ez, Speaker of
the House of Reps. of P.R. 4 (June 27, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carrión V].
197. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R. 3 (Aug. 4, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Carrión VI].
198. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.,
to Sens. Bob Menendez, Dick Durbin, Cory Booker, Kristen Gillibrand, Bernie Sanders, Chris
Murphy, Jeff Merkley, Ed Markey, Kamala Harris, Catherine Cortez Masto, and T ammy
Duckworth 1 (Oct. 11, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carrión VII]; Alex Wolf, Puerto
Rico Board Withdraws Bid to Force Furloughs, LAW 360 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.law
360.com/articles/971463/puerto-rico-board-withdraws-bid-to-force-furloughs.
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that the Puerto Rican government not pay Christmas bonuses to government
employees. 199
On June 29, 2018, the Oversight Board announced that it would devise and
certify its own Fiscal Plan for the Puerto Rican government for 2019 after the
Puerto Rican government failed to repeal certain legislation required by the
Fiscal Plans that the Oversight Board had previously certified. 200 The Oversight
Board’s Fiscal Plan calls for $345 million in spending cuts, including the
elimination of “the annual $25 million [University of Puerto Rico] scholarship
fund; and the public-sector Christmas bonus across all government employees
starting in FY19.”201 After outlining its own version of the Fiscal Plan, the
Oversight Board warned the Puerto Rican government it would certify its own
version of the government budget if the Puerto Rican government’s proposed
budget did not conform with the Fiscal Plan. 202
Tensions escalated when the Puerto Rican government failed to pass a
conforming budget and tried to have the Oversight Board certify a nonconforming budget instead. 203 When the Oversight Board instead certified and
imposed its own version of the budget, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico
sued the Oversight Board. 204 The Legislative Assembly challenged the authority
of the Oversight Board not only to certify budgets but also to impose budgets
and fiscal plans on the Puerto Rican government. 205 It alleged that PROMESA
limited the Oversight Board to giving “non-binding recommendations” to the
Puerto Rican government and thus prevented the Oversight Board from
interfering with the Puerto Rican government’s budgetary power. 206 The
199. Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R. 1 (Nov. 27, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Carrión VIII].
200. Letter from Natalie A. Jaresko, Exec. Dir. of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.,
to Hon. Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R., T homas Rivera Schatz, President of the
Senate of P.R, and Carlos J. Méndez Núnez, Speaker of the House of Reps. of P.R. 1 (June 29,
2018) (on file with author).
201. Id. at 2. T hough the Oversight Board called for the elimination of the scholarship fund,
the Oversight Board intended to replace the fund with an “ independently-managed scholarship
fund” by using “ right-sizing savings achieved from the Legislature, Judiciary, AAFAF, and
FOMB.” Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17 -3283, 2018 U.S. District LEXIS
134839, at *6–7 (D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2018). T he Oversight Board had told the Puerto Rican government
that certification of the budget was conditioned on the repeal of a Puerto Rican law known as Law
80. Id. at 4–5. When the Puerto Rican government failed to repeal Law 80, the Oversight Board
withheld certification of the government’s proposed budget and instead certified its own version of
the budget. Id. at *6–7.
204. Id. at *2–3.
205. Id. at*7–8. Unlike the Legislative Assembly, Governor Rosselló did not challenge the
power PROMESA gave to the Oversight Board despite his disagreements with the Oversight Board.
See, e.g., Letter from Ricardo A. Rosselló Nevares, Governor of P.R., to José L. Carrión, Chairman
of the Fin. Oversight and Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (Jan. 20, 2017) (on file with author).
206. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 2018 U.S. District LEXIS 134839, at *7–8.
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Legislative Assembly therefore sought: (1) a declaratory judgment stating that
the Oversight Board could only provide non-binding recommendations to the
Puerto Rican government, and (2) an order nullifying the Oversight Board’s
budget and compelling the Oversight Board to certify the government’s nonconforming budget. 207
However, on August 7, 2018, the Puerto Rico District Court ruled in favor of
the Oversight Board. 208 First, the court denied the Legislative Assembly’s
request for an order compelling certification of the government’s proposed
budget because PROMESA precluded judicial review of the Oversight Board’s
determinations on the compliance of budgets and fiscal plans. 209 Second, the
court denied the Legislative Assembly’s request for a declaratory judgment
limiting the Oversight Board’s powers to offering non-binding
recommendations because PROMESA explicitly pre-empted any territorial laws
inconsistent with it and allowed the Oversight Board to “render certified budgets
effective by operation of law . . .” despite objections from the Puerto Rican
government. 210
B.

The Failure to Resolve the Tension Only Enables More PROMESA-like
Laws to be Passed

In light of the precedents regarding the Territory Clause, PROMESA is
disconcerting not because Congress passed it, but because Congress can pass
similar laws in the future. Congress has not given Puerto Rico or the other
Territories an equivalent of the Tenth Amendment to prevent encroachment by
the federal government. 211 Because the rights of the Territories are only those
Congress has bestowed upon the Territories, the Territories’ only safeguards
from PROMESA are time and politics, as has been the case since the Northwest
Ordinance. Currently, PROMESA’s definition of “territory” does not foreclose
the ability of Congress to impose Oversight Boards upon the other Territories.212
Keenly aware of this possibility, U.S. Virgin Islands officials in November
2016 had to assure constituents the territory’s own debt problems were not
severe enough to warrant an Oversight Board after the legislature passed a
207. Id.
208. Id. at *18.
209. Id. at *13–14.
210. Id. at *16–18.
211. Such an equivalent would be necessary because in Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v.
Puerto Rico, the First Circuit held a federal bankruptcy provision could preempt Puerto Rico ’s
Recovery Act because, as a territory, Puerto Rico derives its powers from the federal government
and thus “ [t]he limits of the T enth Amendment do not apply to Puerto Rico . . . . ” 805 F.3d 322,
344 (1st Cir. 2015). Because the T enth Circuit ’s decision on this matter hinged on Puerto Rico’s
status as a territory, arguably it follows the T enth Amendment does not apply to the other U.S.
territories either.
212. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 2162(1)(A) (2012) (defining an entity as “ a territory that has
requested the establishment of an Oversight Board or has had an Oversight Board established for it
by the United States Congress in accordance with section 2121 of this title . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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spending bill that narrowly averted a government shutdown. 213 Nonetheless, the
possibility of an Oversight Board for the U.S. Virgin Islands has not been ruled
out because the U.S. Virgin Islands has more debt-per-capita than Puerto Rico
and “rating agencies downgraded its debt to ‘junk’ status in December
[2016].”214 In fact, a coalition of U.S. Virgin Island business organizations has
warned that a “‘PROMESA event’” will occur in the U.S. Virgin Islands if the
territory’s economic wellbeing does not improve. 215 Talk of a “VIOMESA”
arose again after Hurricanes Irma and Maria forced the legislature of the U.S.
Virgin Islands to contemplate a budget shortfall of over $200 million even with
disaster loans. 216
IV. CONCLUSION
As the latest manifestation of the colonial impulse enabled by the Territory
Clause and the jurisprudence regarding it, PROMESA highlights a part of the
Constitution that runs counter to the United States’ democratic values.
PROMESA combines the nigh-limitless regulatory power of Congress over the
U.S. Territories in the 19th century and earlier 20th century with the modern
rationale of flexible governance to strip Puerto Rico of its autonomy. In the
process, PROMESA shows the extent of the U.S. Territories’ dependence on the
benevolence of Congress for their system of government, their legislation, and
even the extension of constitutional protections that the citizens of the States of
the Union take for granted. PROMESA is no exceptional horror, and that fact
is the true horror behind it.

213. Gilbert, supra note 23.
214. Puerto Rico Debt Law Could Apply to U.S. Virgin Islands, JUBILEE USA NETWORK (Dec.
30, 2016), http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2016/12/30/puerto -rico-debt-law-couldapply-us-virgin-islands.
215. Ernice Gilbert, Coalition of Business Organizations Opposes Sin Tax Measure; Unveils
Alternative Ideas, T HE V.I. CONSORTIUM (Jan. 28, 2017), http://viconsortium.com/bus
iness/coalition-of-business-organizations-opposes-sin-tax-measure-unveils-alternative-ideas/.
216. V.I. Budget Crisis, Part 19: Congress Can Still Do a Lot – But If It Doesn’t, Brace For
Impact, St. T homas Source (Dec. 31, 2017), https://stthomassource.com/content/2017/12/31/v-ibudget-crisis-part-19-congress-can-still-do-a-lot-but-if-it-doesnt-brace-for-impact/.
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